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In considering whether I wanted to submit a response to this conference, I
turned back to the Fordham Law Review's Proceedings of the Conference on
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, now referred to by this
conference's participants as Fordham.' While the entire volume helped me to
formulate this response, I want to begin by acknowledging Linda Elrod's and
Ann Haralambie's two responses in Fordham as essential to my decision.' In a
few short pages they encapsulated the essential message of Fordham: that by
the end of the last century, the practice of lawyers for children was to be law-
yers. Elrod and Haralambie both served on the committee that drafted the
American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing a
Child in Abuse and Neglect Cases ("Standards").3 As Elrod plainly states, "the
[Standards] take the position that lawyers should be appointed as lawyers and
act as lawyers irrespective of the age of the client .. " and the consensus of
Fordham was that "the lawyer should always be a lawyer and should not be
forced into a hybrid role . . . ., She then outlines how the newly created
Standards combined with the Fordham Recommendations ("Recommenda-
tions") will prevent a lawyer for children from drifting into a guardian ad litum
("GAL") or hybrid role. In combination, the Standards and the Recommenda-
tions give lawyers a blueprint for their basic obligations to a child client, with
the Recommendations providing a "how to" for lawyers to determine and then
* Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996).
2 Linda D. Elrod, An Analysis of the Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Repre-
senting Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1999 (1996); Ann M.
Haralambie, Response to the Working Group on Determining the Best Interest of the Child,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013 (1996).
3 Elrod, supra note 2, at 2000 n.5. The Standards were adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in February 1996. The Standards can be found at http://www.abanet.org/child/
childrep.html (last visited March 12, 2006) [hereinafter Standards].
' Elrod, supra note 2, at 2001.
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to represent the child's legal interests.5 Pursuing a child's legal interests is
central to rejecting a GAL or hybrid role even for a child unable to direct
representation. As Elrod explains, both the Standards and the Recommenda-
tions reject the idea that lawyers for children can or should be making best
interest determinations on behalf of their clients.6 Rather, the Standards
explicitly require that "[tlo the extent that a child does not or will not express a
preference about particular issues, the child's attorney should determine and
advocate the child's legal interests."'7 Those legal interests can be determined
by taking the myriad steps all lawyers take on behalf of their clients: thorough
factual investigation, significant and appropriate contact with the client, under-
standing the objective criteria of the law related to the purposes of the proceed-
ing, and participating fully and assertively in all aspects of the proceedings
involving the client.8
Haralambie provides additional context for the move away from a lawyer
serving in a GAL role by discussing the synergy between Rule 1.14 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") and the Recommenda-
tions.9 Rule 1.14 requires a lawyer, as much as possible, to maintain a normal
attorney-client relationship with a client with diminished capacity, including a
minor client. Haralambie points out that the Recommendations embrace the
mandate of Rule 1.14 and provide guidance for its use, particularly through the
detailed process outlined in the Report of the Working Group on the Allocation
of Decision Making.'° She notes that using this process will maximize the
child's participation in reaching an understanding of the child's legal interests
while minimizing the lawyer's subjective perspective. Haralambie warns, how-
ever, that for the child's legal interest to be fully protected, judges must
embrace the lawyer's role of independent advocate and stop deferring to the
lawyer's recommendations. Rather, through the adversarial process, the judge
is presented with a full range of perspectives that permit the judge to make the
ultimate decision on behalf of the child."
Ten years later, at the UNLV Conference, the Recommendations of Ford-
ham addressing the appropriate role for a lawyer representing a child were
unequivocally reaffirmed that, "The recommendations .. .affirm and build
upon the Fordham Recommendations regarding the role of counsel for the
child, including the fundamental principle of client-directed representation for
child clients." They also address some of the questions left open by the Ford-
' Elrod, supra note 2, at 2002.
6 The Recommendations affirmatively state that "Although other issues remain unresolved,
the profession has reached a consensus that lawyers for children currently exercise too much
discretion in making decisions on behalf of their clients including 'best interests' determina-
tions." Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1309 (1996).
7 Standards, supra note 3, at § B-4(2).
8 Id. at § B-1.
I Haralambie, supra note 2, at 2016.
10 Id. at 2017; Report of the Working Group on the Allocation of Decision Making, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1325 (1996); see also Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical
Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, supra note 7, at pts. IV, V.
" Haralambie, supra note 2, at 2017.
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ham Conference and recommend "additional prescriptions, methods, and strate-
gies to achieve child-directed and child-centered representation ....
The Working Group on Bests Interests and the Role of the Attorney, which
promulgated the recommendations on attorney role, provide a detailed set of
prescriptions to assist a lawyer in sustaining this child-centered role, building,
in essence, on the Fordham Recommendations and the ABA Standards.'3 The
UNLV Recommendations purposefully advance the requirement that a child's
lawyer must create a relationship with the client that will enable the facts of the
child's life combined with the legal purpose of the representation to result in
child-centered, child-driven advocacy. This approach affirmatively rejects any
type of best interest role for the attorney. Even the lawyer representing a client
unable to direct representation at all or in part, substitutes judgment on behalf
of the child only after taking significant steps to determine what position the
client would want the attorney to take.14
12 Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Chil-
dren's Advocacy and Justice Ten Years after Fordham, 6 NEV. L.J. 592, 613 (2006) [herein-
after Recommendations of the UNLV Conference].
13 Id. This approach is fully explored in JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN
CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS (2001).
I4 These are the current recommendations:
A. Children with Diminished Capacity: When the child has diminished capacity, the child's
attorney should promote client-directed representation by:
i. Adopting a position requiring the least intrusive state intervention;
ii. Being guided by goals that are respectful of and reflect what the client would want and the
decision the child would make if the child could formulate a position;
iii. Respecting the child's family and social connections;
iv. Being familiar with the child's family, community and culture and take precautions to avoid
imposing the attorney's personal standards and cultural values;
v. Giving special weight to the parent's preference in the absence of conflict regarding the partic-
ular matter at issue, parental incapacity, or harm to the child;
vi. Utilizing the following rights and values as further guidance:
(A) Limitation of state intervention in the child's life;
(B) The child's right to have his or her family respected;
(C) Child's liberty interest to be free from state custody; and
(D) The family's liberty interest in parental determination of what is in the child's interests.
d. Children Lacking Capacity: When the child lacks capacity to communicate a position, the
child's attorney should by performing the following non-exhaustive list of duties, in addition to
those listed in Part IV.A.2 above for the child with diminished capacity:
i. Obtain additional pertinent information through investigation and consultation;
ii. Involve parents in the process, but recognize that parents cannot direct the representation;
iii. Protect the child's legal interests.
Recommendations of the UNLV Conference, 6 Nev. L.J. 592, 615 (2006).
It should be noted that the National Association of Counsel for Children has carved out
an exception for entirely client-driven representation in its proposal to modify the ABA
Standards: The distinction between the ABA Standards and the NACC Revised ABA Stan-
dards is that where the ABA remained consistent with the client directed attorney through-
out, the NACC carved out a significant exception where the client cannot meaningfully
participate in the formulation of his or her position. In such cases, the NACC's version calls
for a GAL type judgment using objective criteria. Additionally, the NACC's version
requires the attorney to request the appointment of a separate GAL, after unsuccessful
attempts at counseling the child, when the child's wishes are considered to be seriously
injurious to the child. Compare NACC Recommendations for Representation of Children in
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The participants in UNLV, like the participants in Fordham, represent a
significant cross section of the legal profession's child advocacy leaders.1
5
These leaders will continue to advocate for changes in federal and state laws
and practices that curtail or inhibit the ability of lawyers fully to embrace cli-
ent-centered and client-directed representation. 16 So why respond? Because
there is a parallel process occurring that undermines these core principles and
retreats from the commitment to lawyers for children being lawyers: The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' draft proposal
on the Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect and Custody
Proceedings Act. ("NCCUSL draft").' 7 Given the proximity of this conference
and the NCCUSL drafting schedule, the work of the drafting committee cannot
be ignored. Three aspects of the NCCUSL draft are particularly troublesome
and need to be addressed: the definition of counsel, the appointment of coun-
sel, and the role of the "Court-Appointed Advisor".
II. Definition of Counsel
The NCCUSL draft is a significant retreat from creating a single role for a
child's lawyer. Instead two roles are created. The first is the "child's attorney"
whose role is "to provide legal representation for a child."' 8 The second, while
rightfully rejecting the current practice in a significant number of states of a
hybrid role of attorney and GAL, instead creates a new category of lawyer in
child welfare proceedings: the "best interests attorney".' 9 This attorney is "to
provide legal representation for a child to protect a child's best interests without
being bound by the child's directives or objectives. '2 "A best interests attor-
ney shall advocate for a resolution of the proceeding consistent with the best
interests of the child based on the facts relevant to the proceeding and accord-
ing to criteria established by law related to the purposes of the proceeding."2 1
Finally, the best interests attorney is relieved of her duty to maintain the confi-
Abuse and Neglect Cases, http://www.naccchildlaw.org/training/standards.html (last visited
March 5, 2006); with Standards, supra note 3.
15 These leaders come from various professions, however, including social work, the mental
health and medical professions, and the policy and academic worlds.
16 As they did ten years ago in Fordham: "Laws currently authorizing the appointment of a
lawyer to serve in a legal proceeding as a child's guardian ad litum should be amended to
authorize instead the appointment of a lawyer to represent the child in the proceeding. Rec-
ommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children,
supra note 6, at pt. I.A.1.
17 At the time of this writing, I am referring to the draft that followed the February 3-5,
2006 meeting of the drafting committee. For purposes of this response, I am focusing on the
representation of children in neglect and abuse proceedings and not custody proceedings.
Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect and Custody Proceedings Act,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/RARCCDA/2006FebChildRepStrikeScoreDraft.htm (last
visited on March 12, 2006) [hereinafter NCCUSL draft].
18 Id. at § 2(3). "A child's attorney owes to the child the duties imposed by the law of this
state in an attorney-client relationship." Id. at § 12(a).
19 As Barbara A. Atwood, reporter for the NCCUSL drafting committee, has so helpfully
pointed out, the 2003 ABA Standards on Representing Children in Custody Cases originated
the concept of the "best interests" attorney in custody matters.
20 Id. at § 2(2).
21 Id. at § 13(a).
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dences of the client in order to "use such information, including communica-
tions received from the child in confidence, for the purpose of performing the
duties of a best interests attorney without disclosing that the child was the
source of the information. 22 The commentary then states, "The best interests
attorney provides legal services for the purpose of protecting the child's best
interests."23 Somehow the drafters believe that by giving a new name to some-
one who looks an awful lot like a GAL or hybrid advocate but who has to be a
practicing lawyer and use the best practices of a child's lawyer, they will
resolve the ambiguities of those traditional roles. On the contrary, creating this
role preserves two significant barriers to effective independent representation
on behalf of a child. First, it repudiates the clear direction legal advocacy for
children in child welfare proceedings has been moving in at least since Ford-
ham: to ensure independent representation for all child clients, including cli-
ents unable to direct representation. The lawyer does this by being bound by
the ethical rules of the profession, including the lawyer's ability to ask for a
GAL if the lawyer cannot otherwise adequately represent the client.24 Despite
the drafters' assertions, creating another role perpetuates the confusion about
how to represent children and stymies the extraordinary efforts to refine the
role of the child's lawyer through the multi-disciplinary research and practice
that has flourished in the last decade. Secondly, it reinforces what Martin Gug-
genheim, in his article in this Symposium issue, warns against: that too often
lawyers for children have reinforced the state's interests and not served as inde-
pendent representatives of their clients. 25 As Guggenheim points out, regard-
less of the definition of their role or the desires of their clients, lawyers for
children are under enormous pressure in child welfare proceedings to follow a
"safer course," that contains three elements: a presumption that a conflict
between parent and child exists; an assumption that a parent charged in a neg-
lect or abuse proceeding is unfit; and a form of risk aversion that assumes
separating a child from a parent is more likely to keep the child safe. 2 6 Gug-
genheim posits that over time, lawyers find that by pursuing this safer course
and supporting the state, they "win" more often, reinforcing all lawyers' natural
desire to win.27 But even more relevant for this discussion, Guggenheim iden-
tifies what happens to lawyers who believe their real role is to protect their
clients:
In addition, children's lawyers also get to perform a special role in our culture: that
of "hero." Charged with a special duty to protect their "clients" from danger, chil-
22 id. at § 13(d). This a particularly troublesome aspect of the role but beyond the purview
of this response.
23 Id. at § 13 cmt.
24 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. .14 (2002), available at http://www.law.
comell.edu/ethics/aba/current/ABACODE.htm (last visited March 12, 2006).
25 Martin Guggenheim, How Children's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805
(2006).
26 Id. at 830-31.
27 Id. at 830. Criminal defense lawyers long ago gave up the idea of being seen as heroes.
They understand that their role is to ensure that their client gets the due process a defendant
deserves, even if it makes their lawyer very unpopular. Guggenheim challenges lawyers for
children to understand they have the same responsibility, that they can't represent their cli-
ents and expect to be the hero. Id.
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dren's lawyers are rewarded professionally and emotionally when they step forward
and argue for intervention to prevent possible future harm. We have not designed or
conceived of the children's bar as having been erected to prevent state overreaching.
Quite the opposite. The children's bar exists to ensure that all children who need
state protection receive it. And sometimes the children's lawyer gets to be the pro-
tecting hero.
2 8
Guggenheim warns that as long as lawyers are trapped in this safer course
mode, they fail to be independent advocates for their clients. This, in essence, is
what is so problematic with the NCCUSL best interests attorney who continues
to be the hero by seeing the role as a method to protect his or her client and not
to represent them. Ultimately, the lawyer who is sometimes appointed as the
child's attorney and sometimes as the best interests attorney will find it difficult
to give up the hero role that best interests advocacy provides and assume the
harder role of being a child's attorney. Instead lawyers will persist in usurping
the role of the judge in determining best interests and undermine the full pres-
entation and consideration of relevant information, including the child's coun-
seled wishes and legal interests. Creating two roles for children's lawyers is the
first step backward; the method of appointing those lawyers is the second.
III. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
In calling for a mandatory appointment of counsel for children in abuse
and neglect proceedings, the NCCUSL draft permits the court to "appoint either
a child's attorney or a best interests attorney."'29 The judge is to appoint the
attorney "as soon as practicable to ensure adequate representation of the child
and in any event before the first court hearing that substantially affects the
interests of the child."3 ° The court is to take into consideration factors like "the
child's age and developmental level, any desire for an attorney expressed by
the child, whether the child has expressed objectives in the proceeding, and the
value of an independent advocate for the child's best interests. ' 31 The com-
mentary points out that it is both a legislative and a judicial function to deter-
mine which type of attorney to appoint.32 Essentially, a state can direct the
court either to begin with the presumption that a child should be appointed a
best interests attorney or begin with the presumption that a child should be
appointed a child's attorney. The court then applies that presumption in each
individual case.3 3
This proposal undermines the independence of a lawyer for a child in two
significant ways: first, by allowing the legislature to define the nature of the
28 Id.
29 NCCUSL draft, supra note 17, at § 4(a).
30 Id.
31 Id. at § 4(b).
32 Id. at § 4 cmt. The draft puts the two types of attorneys in brackets so that the state can
determine which kind of attorney to presume.
33 Remarkably, despite the lengthy Prefatory Note that praises both the Fordham Recom-
mendations and the ABA Standards and which cites authors who would start with the pre-
sumption that a child should be appointed a child's attorney, the drafters fail to recommend
to legislatures that they adopt a presumption in favor of appointing a child's attorney. Id. at
Prefatory Note.
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attorney-client relationship and second, by allowing the judiciary to interfere
with the independent judgment that any lawyer brings to representing a client.
A. Legislative Role*
In Polk County v. Dodson, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a public defender was a state actor for purposes of being subject to a
§1983 civil rights action for failing to represent a client adequately.34 The
Court held that the public defender was not a state actor for this purpose.35 In
discussing the role of the public defender, the Court emphasized the indepen-
dent role of assigned counsel, free from state interference:
But a defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant
of an administrative superior. Held to the same standards of competence and integ-
rity as a private lawyer, a public defender works under canons of professional respon-
sibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client. "A
lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render




Second, and equally important, it is the constitutional obligation of the State to
respect the professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages. This
Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright established the right of state criminal
defendants to the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
[them]." Implicit in the concept of a "guiding hand" is the assumption that counsel
will be free of state control. There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the
services of an effective and independent advocate.
37
This standard was reconfirmed twenty years later in Legal Services Corpo-
ration v. Velazquez,38 where the Court addressed the independence of federally
funded civil legal services attorneys. The Court cited Polk County favorably in
distinguishing between activities that legal services attorneys can be barred
from doing generally, such as lobbying, and activities they may do on behalf of
individual clients. The Court recognized that Congress had created a legal pro-
gram to assist the government to achieve a specific end:
By providing subsidies to LSC, the Government seeks to facilitate suits for benefits
by using the state and federal courts and the independent bar on which those courts
depend for the proper performance of their duties and responsibilities. Restricting
LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in presenting arguments and analyses to
the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of the attorneys
* As this reply was going to press, the author was informed that the final NCCUSL draft
would not propose a legislative presumption. This would not prevent a legislature from using
such a presumption, however, so the author believes her discussion is still relevant for
lawmakers and advocates.
34 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
35 Id. at 324-25.
36 Id. at 321 (citing IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR5-107(b));
compare with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5.4(c) (2002)) (internal citations
omitted).
37 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 321-22 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)
which quoted Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (alteration in original)) (internal
citations omitted).
38 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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.... [Congress] may not design a subsidy to effect this serious and fundamental
restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary. 39
Congress could have declined to create a legal program to represent indi-
gent civil clients at all or in only certain types of cases. But once Congress
created the program, "[t]he Constitution does not permit the Government to
confine litigants and their attorneys in this manner."40 If a state requires the
appointment of counsel for children in abuse and neglect proceedings, the same
principles of independence must apply. Once the state has determined that rep-
resentation is necessary to protect the due process rights of a class of individu-
als, the nature of that representation must then be governed by the ethical rules
of the profession.
State legislatures should not be encouraged to circumvent the indepen-
dence of attorneys assigned to represent children. On the contrary, legislative
drafters should be protecting the independent role criminal and civil lawyers
have fought so long to achieve. Moreover, if Guggenheim is correct that states
like child advocates because they are likely to support the position of state
agencies, states are more likely to prefer best interest lawyers in their legisla-
tion and start with the presumption that a best interests lawyer be assigned.'"
B. Judicial Role
Having created two roles for lawyers, the NCCUSL drafters then permit
the judge to appoint the kind of lawyer the judge wants to be representing the
child. The court's "need for information and assistance" can be a determining
factor in what kind of lawyer to appoint.4 2 The judge's fundamental responsi-
bility to be impartial and the lawyer's obligation to provide independent and
zealous representation are fatally eroded by this scheme. Furthermore, on a
practical basis, the judge's ability to make this determination "as soon as practi-
cable to ensure adequate representation of the child and in any event before the
first court hearing that substantially affects the interests of the child,"4 3 is
clearly impossible. With the exception of age, the criteria that the draft asks the
judge to consider-"the child's age and developmental level, any desire for an
39 Id. at 534.
40 Id. at 548.
41' Guggenheim, supra note 25, at 830-31.
Because the children's bar is behaving in precisely the way the state officials expect them to,
they are embraced by state officials. Lawyers for children may be feisty in various dimensions
of child welfare practice, but they infrequently attack head-on the imbalances in the system.
Lawyers for children rarely publicly oppose the removal of children as occurring too frequently
or as being rubber stamped by judges. That kind of criticism seems to be out of bounds for
children's lawyers.
Id. at 831.
Children's lawyers who are known as fighters for their clients commonly engage in fights which
state officials do not mind. They are far more likely to insist upon keeping siblings together in
foster care than in opposing placement in foster care. They are more likely to insist on regular
supervised visitation with parents than on pushing for return before the agency believes return is
appropriate. They are also more likely to press for "permanence" and be equally comfortable
with adoption as with reuniting children with their families of origin.
Id. at 832.
42 NCCUSL draft, supra note 17, at § 4(b).
41 Id. at § 4(a).
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attorney expressed by the child, whether the child has expressed objectives in
the proceeding, and the value of an independent advocate for the child's best
interests"44-cannot possibly be determined at the outset of the proceedings.
The drafters urge the judge to draw on the insights of "the abundant literature
of children's psychological, cognitive, and emotional development,"45 as if
understanding the theoretical literature provides the basis of an appointment for
an individual child whose case is suddenly before the court but who is rarely, if
ever, produced on the day of the appointment of counsel. Even if the child
were present in court, how would the court know what to do? The judge cannot
interview the child at this point in the proceedings, will have little information
other than the allegations in the initial pleadings, is unlikely to have any rele-
vant information from the mental health professions, and is faced with a child
suffering significant trauma through neglect or abuse, the ensuing investigation,
and/or through removal from her parents. The very reason for appointing coun-
sel for the child as early as possible is so the lawyer can begin implementing
the myriad obligations of effective assistance of counsel that will ultimately
shape the representation the lawyer provides.46 As we have memorialized in
the recommendations of this conference, the scope and meaning of those obli-
gations has become increasingly complex.47 A judge appointing counsel can-
not possible "know" what kind of counsel to provide when the parties first
appear in court.
Beyond this practical barrier is the fundamental problem of the court
defining the nature of the attorney-client relationship in clear violation of a
lawyer's ethical obligations. The attorney, once appointed, must make that
determination. Perhaps one of the most succinct statements of how an attorney
shoulders the responsibility to determine the relationship with his or her client
is from the First Star Principles on Representation of Children:
Every child is presumed competent and entitled to contribute to his or her representa-
tion to the fullest extent feasible given the child's cognitive and developmental
capacities, absent a showing that he or she is unable to comprehend or make ade-
quately considered decisions in connection with the representation after being coun-
seled by his or her attorney. If the child's attorney determines that it is necessary to
substitute judgment for the child, the attorney must continue to maintain an attorney-
client relationship with the child, to the fullest extent feasible given the child's cogni-
tive and developmental capacities, as well as inform the court of the child's wishes.
4 8
This standard recognizes, as does the ABA Model Rule 1.14, Client with a
Diminished Capacity, that an essential component of independent representa-
tion is struggling with the potential challenges a client with diminished capacity
presents.49 If the child is going to benefit from independent representation, this
44 Id. at § 4(b).
" Id. at § 4 cmt.
46 As all child advocates have experienced, it is very difficult to take a reasoned position
early in proceedings without the opportunity to investigate fully.
" See for example, the Report of the Working Group on the Lessons of International Law,
Norms, and Practice which outlines the transnational nature of child clients and their fami-
lies. 6 NEV. L.J. 856 (2006).
48 First Star Principles on Representation of Children (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
" MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2002).
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remains the lawyer's struggle. Moreover, because the client is a child, the
nature of the potential incapacity may change over time. The lawyer must be
attuned to the client's developing capacity and adjust the representation to
reflect these changes. The NCCUSL draft also shifts that adjustment from the
lawyer to the judge. Only a judge can change an appointment from a best
interests attorney to a child's attorney. 50 The attorney essentially has to go
back to court and provide information that would justify this change, once
again impermissibly involving the judge in the very core of the attorney-client
relationship. Ironically, in the prefatory note, even the NCCUSL drafters con-
cede that a bests interests attorney is ultimately not necessary to achieve a
child's best interests: "[A] child-directed lawyer functioning in the role of a
child's attorney will ultimately facilitate the court's resolution in the child's
best interests .... and the child's attorney may, in situations justifying substi-
tuted judgment... advocate a position the lawyer believes is in the child's best
interests."'5 1 Given this acknowledgment, there is no justification for creating
an entirely new legislative system which undermine the court's impartial role
and ultimately damages the substantial efforts of conferences like Fordham and
UNLV to define and clarify a single role for lawyers for children.
III. APPOINTMENT OF A COURT ADVISOR
If the NCCUSL draft was not convoluted enough, the final complication is
the introduction of a "Court-Appointed Advisor" ("Advisor") to the design in
abuse and neglect proceedings. The Advisor is "an individual appointed to
assist the court in determining the best interests of the child."52 Currently two
different alternatives are available for states to consider:
1. If a child's attorney is appointed, the court shall appoint an Advisor; if a best
interests attorney is appointed, the court may appoint an Advisor; or
2. Regardless of whether the lawyer is a child's attorney or a best interests attorney,
the court may also appoint an Advisor.
53
In either case, the Advisor is directed to meet with the child, meet with the
child's lawyer (of whatever ilk), carry out an independent investigation, and "if
appropriate" make recommendations to the court regarding the child's best
interests.54 In conducting the investigation, the Advisor is required to "deter-
mine, in a manner appropriate to the child's developmental level, the child's
expressed objectives in the proceeding. 55 In essence, this proposal requires
the child not only to talk, perhaps repeatedly, to another adult about the nature
and meaning of the proceedings (until that person figures out the child's
50 NCCUSL draft, supra note 17, at § 10 & cmt.
5I Id. at § 2 cmt. (text omitted in current draft). Moreover, the child's attorney, even as
defined in the draft, can take steps to seeks the assistance of what would be the equivalent of
a GAL if the attorney determined that step were necessary. Id. at Prefatory Note & n.20,
§ 12(d)(3) & cmt., § 13 cmt.
52 Id. at § 5. This article is not addressing the issue of appointments in custody cases where
an Advisor may also be appointed.
53 Id. at 19. There are other factors involved in the appointment that are unnecessary to
elaborate at this point.
54 Id. at § 14(6).
55 Id. at § 14(2).
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expressed objectives), but also to have this person significantly interfere with
the attorney-client relationship. The commentary states, "[i]f the child is repre-
sented by counsel, whether child's attorney or best interests attorney, the court-
appointed advisor must notify counsel and permit counsel to be present during
any interview. ' 56 Permit? The child is represented by counsel! The Advisor
cannot be given the authority to permit counsel to be present; counsel decides
whether to subject her client to yet another interview by an adult who has no
obligation to maintain the client's confidences. 57 As with the appointment
issue, this proposal further undermines a lawyer's ability to represent a client.
The National Association of Counsel for Children succinctly stated its concerns
with the Advisor system in a June 15, 2005 memorandum to the NCCUSL
drafters:
We believe the reliance on a court advisor in general is misplaced. It forces the child
to have yet another adult to deal with and it is a mistake to assume this advisor will
have a special protective relationship with the child such that the child would dis-
close information to such a person that the child would not disclose to his/her own
lawyer with whom there is a confidential relationship.
58
The purported purpose of the Advisor is to substitute for the maligned
GAL. 59 Used properly-not as a substitute for independent counsel-how-
ever, the GAL remains an important and legally defined resource for a lawyer
who determines within ethical boundaries that she requires protective assis-
tance for her client.60 There is no justification for the Advisor role that inter-
feres with the attorney-client role, subjects children to multiple interviews and
other interventions, and adds tremendous cost to an already under-resourced
system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The disparity between the direction of child advocacy in the last fifteen
years and the proposals contained in the NCCUSL draft cannot be reconciled.
These proposals fail to embrace the role of counsel for children as a fully inde-
pendent attorney with the tools and support necessary to shoulder a complex
but rewarding job. Instead, the proposal confuses roles-of the legislature, the
judiciary, and the lawyer-and leaves the reader with the unhappy conclusion
that the drafters substituted their judgment on behalf of children without deter-
mining what position those children would have wanted the drafters to take.
56 Id. at § 14 cmt.
57 The Advisor determines whether to maintain confidentiality unless other laws of the state
apply. Id. at § 14(5).
58 Memorandum from The National Association of Counsel for Children to NCCUSL (June
15, 2005) (on file with author).
59 NCCUSL draft, supra note 17, at Prefatory Note.
60 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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